At the outset, I want to thank Deputy O’Callaghan for the opportunity to
engage with Members on the critically important issues of Garda
accountability and oversight.
Indeed, I welcome the opportunity for Members of this House to reflect on
the role and work of the Policing Authority which I believe is undertaking
very valuable work since its establishment.
While I acknowledge and appreciate that the Bill purports to provide the
Authority with additional powers in line with Recommendations contained in
the Joint Committee’s December 2016 Report of on Garda Oversight and
Accountability, I regret that I must oppose the Bill now before the House.
My opposition is primarily but not limited to the issue of its timing which
doesn’t take account of the process underway through the Commission on the
Future of Policing in Ireland or the legislation governing the Policing
Authority, in particular section 62O of the Garda Síochána Act 2005. There
are further serious difficulties with the Bill which I will outline later
in my speech.
, I must, unfortunately, draw the attention of the House to the substantial
grounds that exist for opposing the Bill.
It goes without saying that the Government is fully supportive in principle
of the Policing Authority having appropriate powers so that it can carry
out its oversight functions in an efficient manner
Commission on the Future of Policing
A fundamental difficulty with the Bill is that it is being introduced at a
time when the Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland, established
in April 2017 following consultation with the parties opposite, is
undertaking a comprehensive examination of all aspects of policing.
That examination will comprehend all functions currently carried out by An
Garda Síochána and the range of bodies with oversight and accountability
roles; namely, the Policing Authority, the Garda Síochána Inspectorate, the
Garda Síochána Ombudsman Commission, the Department and Government.
I note in particular that Deputy O’Callaghan is on record as welcoming both
the membership and the full terms of reference for the Commission and,
indeed, has committed his party to working constructively with the
Commission.
The House will be aware that the Commission is to report by September 2018
and it may, in accordance with its terms of reference bring forward
immediate proposals and rolling recommendations for implementation in
advance of its final report.
The terms of reference require the Commission to bring forward proposals
addressing the following five themes:
• structures and management arrangements required for the most
effective delivery of policing (including all functions currently
carried out by An Garda Síochána);
• appropriate composition, recruitment and training of personnel;
• culture and ethos of policing;
• appropriate structures for oversight and accountability; and
• legislative framework for policing.
I want to emphasise again that “oversight and accountability” is one of the
five themes under consideration by the Commission.
While I appreciate that the Deputy’s Bill has been initiated in the spirit
of trying to contribute positively to the overall governance and oversight
architecture for An Garda Síochána, I strongly believe that progressing
this Bill through the legislative process has the potential to cause
uncertainty for the Commission. This is particularly so given that the
Commission is also required to examine the legislative framework for
policing.
Having said that, I fully acknowledge that there is a serious need to
further reform the governance framework for policing in the State and this
is evidenced in the terms of reference set for the Commission by the
Government.
There is a clear consensus in the House as to the need for reform and I
would have thought that there should also be consensus on the methodology
by which that reform would be identified and effected – namely, on foot of
the Commission’s report and recommendations.
I’d like to take this opportunity to again encourage Members to engage with
the Commission on the Future of Policing in Ireland as it goes about its
important consultation and analysis.
Policing Authority to prepare a report on effectiveness of Authority and
adequacy of its functions
Furthermore, I must draw Members attention to section 62O of the Garda
Síochána Act 2005. This is the section that requires the Policing
Authority to prepare a report on the effectiveness of the Authority and the
adequacy of the functions assigned to it by the legislation. The report can
contain recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the Authority
and must be submitted to me, as Minister, by the end of this year and I am
required to lay that report before the Houses.
While it is, of course, accepted that the Authority must have whatever
powers it needs to carry out its oversight functions, it is premature of
the legislature that gave them the role of identifying any gaps in the
legislation to then presume to know the answers before the Authority has
spoken. In my view, it would be better to wait to hear from the Authority
and to then consider what legislative changes are required. It would then
be for this House to decide whether to make such changes in the early part
of 2018 or whether to wait for the Commission report in September.
Instead, if this Bill is enacted in advance of either the Authority or
Commission reports, we run the risk of being accused of failing once again
to deal comprehensively in a holistic way with the accountability and
governance of the Garda Síochána.
Indeed, the very fact that we have commenced legislative consideration of
the Bill could be construed as evidence of a fragmented and incoherent
approach to the much-needed reform of An Garda Síochána.
Policing Authority views on the Bill
While it is clearly the case that law-making in the State is the exclusive
prerogative of the Oireachtas, I felt that it would assist our
deliberations if the views of the Policing Authority on Deputy
O’Callaghan’s Bill were sought. I want to place on record my appreciation
of the time taken by the Authority to engage positively with the Bill and
for providing me with their analysis. In its observations, the Authority
has some concerns with the Bill, in particular, about the implications for
its independent oversight role should it be conferred with the supervisory
or operational powers outlined in the Bill. In the view of the Authority,
the Bill has the potential to weaken the clarity in the existing statutory
framework about the role and function of the Commissioner’s
responsibilities and accountability and compromise the independent
oversight role of the Authority.
The Authority is also of the view that the Bill is premature at this
juncture given the ongoing work of the Commission on the Future of Policing
in Ireland. It considers that the Commission should be allowed to complete
its work and produce its report.
The Authority also makes the point that it does not have any role in
relation to the security of the State and that accordingly, it would not be
in a position to assume the responsibilities in the Bill that relate to
security.
Bill makes no distinction between policing and security matters
Taking up this point about security, I now want to address what is perhaps
the most serious difficulty with the Bill; namely that it makes no
distinction between policing and security matters.
Deputies will recall that, during the passage of the Garda Síochána
(Policing Authority and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015 through the
Houses, the Oireachtas decided that the Authority was to have no role in
relation to security services. Rather, the 2015 Act established a reporting
relationship between the Garda Commissioner and the Authority in relation
to policing services. This distinction between policing and security is in
part, intended address any constitutional issues concerning the delegation
of the Government’s executive powers under article 28 of the Constitution.
However, the Bill now before the House makes no distinction between
security and policing services and serves to give the Authority oversight
over the security functions of An Garda Síochána, putting these provisions
in direct conflict with the other sections of the Garda Act dealing with
the functions of the Authority and brings the Bill and by extension the
Act, if the Bill were to be enacted, into potentially difficult
constitutional terrain.
But even if there were no constitutional issues, the Bill makes no
concession to the fact that the other provisions in Garda Act that delimit
the Authority’s remit to policing services. Instead, if we enact this
Bill, the Authority will be both excluded from dealing with security issues
and responsible for directing the Commissioner in relation to them. I fail
to see how this can be right.
Main provisions of Bill and key areas of concern
I now turn to the main provisions of the Bill and I will outline some of
the key areas of concern always bearing in mind the concerns already
outlined in relation to security matters.
Section 2 of the Bill requires the Commissioner to keep the Authority fully
informed of each and every matter that has required an internal review,
audit or examination of the functions or operation of An Garda Síochána and
which were requested by the Garda Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner or
any Assistant Commissioner.
In practice, current legislation enables the Authority to require the
Commissioner to provide it with any reviews, audits or examinations that it
considers necessary for the performance of its functions.
I would refer the Deputy to section 41A(2) of the Garda Síochána Act 2005
under which the Authority can require the Commissioner to furnish a report
on “any matters connected with policing services or the performance of the
functions of the Commissioner relating to such services that may be
specified in the requirement”. The Commissioner is obliged to provide that
report and the Authority can publish it.
This provision is additional to the provision at section 41A(1) of the Act
which requires the Commissioner to keep the Authority fully informed of
matters relevant to the functions of the Authority and any other matters
that the Commissioner considers should be brought to the attention of the
Authority. This is the provision that the Minister relies on for the
receipt of reports on important matters from the Commissioner. It would
seem odd that different criteria were to be applied to the provision of
material to the Authority than applies to the provision of material to the
Minister and the Government. This is particularly so given that the
Commissioner remains fully accountable to the Minister for the performance
of the Commissioner’s functions and those of An Garda Síochána.
Section 3 of the Bill purports to enable the Authority to summarily dismiss
any member of the Garda Síochána where it forms the opinion that, by reason
of the member’s conduct, his or her continued membership would undermine
public confidence in An Garda Síochána and the dismissal is necessary to
maintain that confidence.
The proposition that the Authority could dismiss the Commissioner or Deputy
Commissioner was considered in the development of the Garda Síochána
(Policing Authority and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2015 but, on the
basis of legal advice provided by the Attorney General, the Act provides
that the Authority can recommend to Government the dismissal of the
Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner if the reasons for removal relate to
policing services.
It is unclear how this provision, which appears to provide the Authority
with a power to summarily dismiss senior members of An Garda Síochána will
operate with the existing statutory framework at sections 11, 12, 13 and
13A of the 2005 Act and which provides the Authority with significant
powers in relation to the removal of members of An Garda Síochána. This
framework contains detailed procedures to guarantee fair process for the
persons concerned.
Section 4 of the Bill would require the Authority to:
· supervise the functioning of the Garda Commissioner’s Office and
supervise the discharge of functions by the Commissioner;
· establish policies and procedures for An Garda Síochána which shall be
binding on all members of An Garda Síochána;
· cause to be published and made accessible to the public all sections of
the Garda Code and Garda operational policies and procedures, save where
such publication would undermine national security or crime prevention
and detection as decided by the Authority in consultation with the Garda
Commissioner; and
· review the adequacy and appropriateness of the policies and procedures
which underpin the operation of An Garda Síochána;
Under current law, the Authority performs a wide range of functions which
are very extensive in terms of overseeing the corporate governance
structures and performance of An Garda Síochána in the policing area. In
particular, the Garda Commissioner is required to cooperate with the
Authority. Also, the Commissioner must report to the Authority regarding
policing matters to facilitate the performance of the Authority’s functions
and provide it with relevant material.
Rather than critiquing the individual elements of this section, I would
draw attention to two key difficulties with it. First, the intention is
that the Policing Authority would supervise the discharge by the
Commissioner of his functions and could direct him in the management of his
office and the performance of his functions. The Policing Authority is an
independent oversight body. The Garda Síochána must report to the
Authority in relation to policing matters but is fully accountable to the
Minister and the Government. To insinuate the Authority into the
management of the Garda Síochána in the various ways set out in this
section, would transform the role of the Authority from overseer to
supervisor and director. The question that would then arise is, who would
the Authority be accountable to for the operation of the Commissioner’s
office. Say the Authority directed the Commissioner to do something that
went wrong, who would be answerable and to whom?
The second problem is that under section 26 of the Act, the Commissioner is
responsible for directing and controlling the Garda Síochána. He is
required, and I quote: ‘to carry on and manage and control generally the
administration and business of the Garda Síochána’. Deputy O’Callaghan
proposes no amendment to section 26 that would recognise that what he
proposing in section 4 of his Bill would be in direct conflict with the
provisions of section 26 unless it is amended.
Section 5 of the Bill appears to be intended to provide the Inspectorate
with a right to enter any Garda Station without giving prior notice to the
Garda Síochána. However, under section 117(6) the approval of the Minister
would be required before any such ‘visit’ were to take place. I don’t know
if this is what is intended by Deputy O’Callaghan but this is the only
provision in the Act that would require the Inspectorate to get the
approval of the Minister in order to carry out their functions. It is also
unclear how the provision interacts with section 118 of the Act which
requires that a written protocol be agreed between the Inspectorate and the
Garda Síochána in relation to the provision of information required by the
Inspectorate.
Conclusion
In conclusion, let me reiterate that the Government is fully supportive of
the Authority having appropriate powers so that it can carry out its
oversight functions in an effective and efficient manner.
However, I believe that it is reasonable to propose that any extension to
the Authority’s powers must take account of the views of the Authority as
to what additional powers it needs and the recommendations from the
Commission on the Future of Policing. The Bill before the House pre-empts
both of these.
I am sure that Deputies will agree that any further legislation extending
the Authority’s powers or functions must not create internal conflict with
the existing legislative framework establishing the Authority and must not
extend the Authority’s remit into the area of national security – these are
key difficulties with the Bill now under debate.
I have read in the media that Deputy O’Callaghan believes that if his Bill
had been enacted, we would not have experienced the recent Garda
controversies. I don’t accept this. At the root of the controversies we
have seen are deep cultural issues that are not amenable to quick legal
fixes – if they were, there would be no problem that a piece of legislation
couldn’t solve. Policing is complex and the responses to problems with
policing have to reflect that complexity.
Having said that, I welcome and share Deputy O’Callaghan’s genuine and
sincere commitment to reform of the Garda Síochána. Where we disagree is
on the timing of further legislative change. I am convinced that further
ad hoc piecemeal legislative change at this point, even if the Bill before
us didn’t have the deficiencies that I have mentioned, would be wrong.
Instead, we should allow the Authority, having operated under the existing
legislative framework, to tell us what it believes is needed and perhaps
more importantly for the Commission on the Future of Policing to report.
Then we will be in a position to consider comprehensive proposals that will
address the governance and accountability framework in a holistic manner.
In the meantime, while I fully understand and acknowledge the spirit in
which the Bill was introduced, I must, on behalf of the Government, oppose
the Bill.