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Speech by Minister Finian McGrath on Private Members Business: Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Bill

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Speech by Minister Finian McGrath on Private Members Business: Statute

of Limitations (Amendment) Bill

6 April 2017

Ceann Comhairle,

I am speaking on behalf of the Tánaiste and Minister for Justice and

Equality who regrets that she cannot be present due to other official

commitments.

I would like to thank Deputy Wallace for his introduction of the Statute of

Limitations (Amendment) Bill 2017. I also appreciate that his introduction

of this Bill draws on experience “over the past six years in dealing with

people throughout Ireland who are in debt or have a debt hanging over

them”. It thus has an overall context related to the management of

indebtedness and enforceability of debts. The key challenge for

policy-making in these areas is that of balancing the interests and rights

of the parties concerned while also affording the opportunity for a

negotiated rather than an imposed outcome.

Very real concerns have arisen from the structure and varied scope of this

Bill in its initial consideration both by the Department of Justice and

Equality and the Office of the Attorney General and on foot of which the

Government has decided to oppose the Bill. It makes proposals across

several fronts which do not necessarily hang well together. For example, it

is proposed that the limitation period, which is generally 6 years for

bringing a range of contract and tort claims and some other types of claims

including those based on quasi-contract or recognizances and seamen's

wages, be reduced to just 2 years. There is a proposed exception for

personal injuries cases based on negligence, nuisance or breach of

statutory duty where the limitation period would be increased from current

2 years to 3 years. The limitation period for enforcing liabilities arising

from a document under seal, an arbitration award or certain company related

debts is to be reduced from 12 to 2 years. From these examples, one can see

the broad sweep of this Bill’s revisions to the limitations regime, many of

which do not seem to relate to the key issue of contract debts which has

been highlighted.

A key proposal of Deputy Wallace’s Bill, which would have very broad

implications, is that the limitation period for enforcing a court judgment,

of any type, is reduced from the current 12 years to just 2 years. It is

also envisaged that interest may only be claimed on a judgment debt for a

maximum of 2 years from the date on which the interest became due. Apart

from fines for criminal offences, the limitation period for enforcing any

penalty or forfeiture sum recoverable by virtue of any enactment is to be

reduced to 2 years.

An apparent anomaly is that while the Bill cuts limitations periods

generally, it also provides an exception for slander where the limitation

period would be increased to three-years from the current 1-year period

albeit extendable by up to two years by the court. Nor is it clear why the

Bill proposes to extend the limitation period for slander but not for libel

– particularly given that the distinction between the two was abolished by

the Defamation Act of 2009. Fundamentally, it does not follow, as the Bill

suggests, that because the bankruptcy period has been reduced from 12 years

to 1 year that there should be commensurate reductions in the periods

following which actions in contract or tort law become statute barred. They

are different areas of law with largely different objectives, rights and

legal principles in play.

While it is appreciated that Deputy Wallace would wish to reduce the period

under which debtors and others are under the threat of an action, it is

considered that the Bill’s unilateral and sweeping approach to the

reduction of limitation periods on so many fronts at once has the very real

potential to have the very opposite effect for various reasons that I will

outline. The core of the Government’s concerns is that while the proposed

Bill would shorten the duration of a potential creditor’s action against a

debtor it would, by the same token, effectively deprive both creditors and

debtors of time and options. That is to say, deprive all parties of any

space or reasonable time for a negotiated resolution which can take better

account of personal, financial, family or business circumstances. Such

space and time can be to the benefit not only of those seeking payment of

monies owed to them but also to those who owe such monies.

If the Bill were implemented as proposed, it would potentially increase

pressures on debtors by compelling creditors to take earlier action, that

is to say within two years as opposed to six. It would render creditors

less amenable to reaching negotiated agreements with debtors. Indeed, we

would be incentivising the harshest and most immediate of debt-enforcement

or recovery options. Putting such pressure on creditors to sue, as would

undoubtedly arise, would not, therefore, be in ease of debtors. This

scenario could also have the effect of drastically increasing the number of

actions brought before the courts by creditors who would feel compelled to

act immediately. In short, in so far as debtors are concerned, the Bill as

put could well back-fire and risks provoking a rapid increase in

repossession actions on home mortgage arrears – just as those numbers are

falling.

As far as the proposed two-year limitation period proposed by the Bill for

the enforcement of a judgement is concerned, this could, in certain

circumstances, render a judgement potentially unenforceable. For example,

it could take longer than two years to complete an order for sale on foot

of a judgement mortgage of the High Court. By the same token, there would

be a concern as to the effect of such a radically foreshortened limitation

period on property rights. This could well arise where creditors may be

denied the time to access information on mortgage default and other

relevant issues before taking action. It is also considered that such a

reduction would conflict with the primary objective of the Central Bank’s

Code of Conduct for Mortgage Arrears - which is to assist indebted

borrowers in addressing their mortgage debt without the loss of the family

home - by reducing the time a creditor would have to act to secure the

asset.

Another fundamental concern is that the Bill, as it stands, would include

within the scope of its potential creditors not just banks or big

investment funds but also trade creditors ranging from large companies to

SMEs who provide goods or services on credit to other businesses or to

consumers. This could impact adversely on them, particularly from an

enforcement perspective. Similar enforcement concerns could also apply in

relation to revenue actions taken before the High Court by the Collector

General.

In the current context of Brexit negotiations it is also of concern that

the Bill would result in our jurisdiction having a limitation regime

markedly different from those of England and Wales under their Limitation

Act of 1980, and of Northern Ireland under the Limitation (Northern

Ireland) Order of 1989. These regimes have core limitation periods of six

years with 12 years for contracts under seal. By the same token,

introducing any unbalanced changes in creditors’ rights to enforce loans,

particularly ones that could end up being out of step with those applicable

in similar jurisdictions, also carries the risk of reducing the willingness

of banks to offer credit, particularly mortgages, and that of increasing

interest rates. The Bill also fails to acknowledge the relevant provisions

of the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991 relating to personal

injury claims which, as amended by the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004,

provides for a 2-year limitation period in personal injury cases in

general. Similarly, the Consumer Protection (Regulation of Credit Financing

Firms) Act 2015 which seeks to ensure that relevant borrowers such as

mortgage holders and SMEs whose loans are sold to third parties maintain

the regulatory protections that they enjoyed prior to sale.

In putting forward this Bill it is argued that reducing the periods after

which contract or tort claims become statute barred would reflect recent

changes made in personal insolvency and bankruptcy. However, this reflects

a misunderstanding. This is particularly so in relation to bankruptcy - we

have reduced the normal bankruptcy period from 12 years down to 1 year, but

it has to be remembered that a person who becomes bankrupt still loses all

their assets and surplus income in the process. The comparison with

personal insolvency is also amiss. Far from seeking to compress the period

for creditors to take legal action or to enforce debts, personal insolvency

provides a court-supervised protected period for negotiations during which

creditors cannot issue proceedings or pressurise the debtor. Personal

insolvency also enables courts to adjourn repossession proceedings to

facilitate a negotiated settlement.

Despite an unprecedented crisis in personal debt and particularly in home

mortgage debt, which still bears heavily on many families, the extensive

series of reforms and initiatives put in place by the Government is bearing

fruit. Home mortgage arrears are falling steadily now for 14 consecutive

quarters. 121,000 home mortgages have been restructured. Numbers of

repossession orders, and of new repossession proceedings are falling

significantly. Almost six thousand vouchers were issued under the Abhaile

mortgage arrears resolution service to borrowers still at risk of losing

their homes, for free, independent, expert financial and legal advice. We

have also seen the abolition of the so-called ‘bank veto’ in personal

insolvency. Almost a thousand applications for personal insolvency

arrangements were made in the last quarter of 2016. The latest sample of

concluded personal insolvency arrangements shows that 89% kept the person

in their home, with another 7% choosing to rent instead. Most recently,

reforms have been made to get Mortgage to Rent working on the ground. In a

recent assessment of solutions available to borrowers the Central Bank

found that “there is strong evidence that banks and non-banks are looking

to exhaust available options before moving into legal processes”. While we

still have work to do it is critically important that these advances and

reforms are not undermined by measures which could ramp up pressure on

creditors to litigate and enforce, rather than to adjourn and negotiate.

For the many reasons I have just outlined, the Government is opposing the

proposed Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Bill. It is also the view of

the Government, in opposing the Bill, that the various, fundamental,

cross-cutting and sweeping measures being proposed would need to be

considered coherently as part of an overall reform of our limitation of

actions regime. As acknowledged by Deputy Wallace, we have an instrument

for such reform in the Law Reform Commission Report number 104 of 2011 and

its recommendations. We need to take the kind of approach advocated by the

Commission, and look carefully at the potential interactions of measures

implemented since 2011. We must do this so as not to contribute further to

the ad hoc, random and haphazard nature of the current limitations regime

that the Law Reform Commission has criticised and is seeking to change by

the creation of a simpler and more intelligible “core limitations regime”.